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 Alija Izetbegovic |
| 7. BOSNIA |
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| As fighting continued to rage in Croatia, it became
evident that the war could spread to Bosnia. The diplomatic challenge for the West was to
contain the conflict and prevent bloodshed in Bosnia, which because of the events of the
Second World War held the potential for dreadful violence. Thanks to the skillful efforts
of the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Jose Cutileiro, acting under the auspices of the
European Union, an agreement was reached among the three ethnic leaders of Bosnia that
seemed to offer an acceptable compromise aimed at preventing violence. |
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| The agreement called for an
independent Bosnia divided into three constituent and geographically separate parts, each
of which would be autonomous. While not a perfect solution the agreement was preferable to
civil war. In March 1992, each of the three leaders: Izetbegovic for the Muslims, Boban
for the Croats, and Karadzic for the Serbs, signed the so-called Lisbon Agreement. Among
diplomats in Belgrade there was general relief and for the first time a sense of hope for
the future. Alas it was not to be. |
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| Within days of the Lisbon
Agreement, the United States Ambassador, Warren Zimmerman flew to Sarajevo and met with
Izetbegovic. Upon finding that Izetbegovic was having second thoughts about the agreement
he had signed in Lisbon, the Ambassador suggested that if he withdrew his signature, the
United States would grant recognition to Bosnia as an independent state. Izetbegovic then
withdrew his signature and renounced the agreement. |
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| Within days the war had spread to Bosnia. Ironically,
after 200,000 deaths and massive destruction throughout Bosnia, the Muslims were afforded
by the terms of the Dayton Accords, less territory than they had been guaranteed by the
Lisbon Agreement. |
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| There has been a good deal of speculation
about why the United States chose to intervene in Bosnia and why it influenced Izetbegovic
to renounce the Lisbon Agreement. One explanation is that the United States wished to
demonstrate to the Muslim world that it could support Muslim causes. After the Gulf War,
it is suggested, the USA was anxious to find a Muslim position with which it could ally
itself. The official U.S position for its intervention was that recognition was the only
way to prevent the war from spreading to Bosnia! Whatever the reason, it seems evident the
U.S. intervention did more harm than good. |
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